Patriotic theft - part 6 (VIDEO)

At the end of this series, after all the evidence shown in the previous episodes, and due to the misrepresentation of our intent, we are obliged to clarify that this series was titled "Patriotic" Theft because, for years, patriotism has been used as a justification for various abuses.

During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the period of sanctions, and daily inflation, individuals like Željko Ražnatović Arkan and Milorad Ulemek Legija were declared patriots. Today, it is Zvonko Veselinović and his associates.

The principle remains the same: the louder the calls for patriotism and Serbdom, the more the situation is exploited for theft. If anyone dares to point out these abuses, they are immediately labeled as a traitor to the Serbian people, and that’s where the conversation ends.

However, this time, the story didn’t end that way. Various accusations against the Insider show, from the same circle of people, concluded with the Committee for Kosovo and Metohija of the Serbian Parliament, composed of representatives from all parties, voting by a majority in late October to propose that the Serbian Parliament establish an Investigative Committee. This committee would examine all abuses in the allocation of budget funds for Kosovo, distributed under various pretexts from 2000 to the present, but without oversight.

Opposing the proposal were former Minister for Kosovo and Metohija from the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) Slobodan Samardžić, Marko Jakšić, also from DSS, and Momir Stojanović from SNS. Momir Stojanović served as the director of VBA from 2003 to 2004, and prior to that, was the head of operational affairs in the Priština Corps of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro.

Committee Session on Kosovo and Metohija, October 30, 2012.

Slobodan Samardžić, DSS: Regarding the proposal, content-wise it’s completely acceptable; it’s something the Parliament should have done. However, the timing is not suitable because it coincides with a complete and hysterical campaign led by B92 against the local government in Kosovo and Metohija and the overall policy that Serbia is conducting in Kosovo and Metohija, creating an atmosphere of persecution.

Borko Stefanović, DS: I think it’s crucial that we avoid having any TV show, on any network, lead investigations on our behalf. That’s my clear motivation. Parliament should give its voice; this should have been done long ago, and I agree with you, Professor. For this reason, I believe we should vote on this proposal. Thank you.

Milovan Drecun, Chairman, SNS: Shall we wait until Insider finishes its broadcast so we can approach this more calmly?

Momir Stojanović, SNS: We can certainly make a recommendation to the relevant state authorities to investigate this. However, if an Investigative Committee of the Parliament takes on this task, it will further complicate our negotiating team’s position and the overall situation, focusing on peripheral rather than essential matters. Thank you.

Milovan Drecun, Chairman, SNS: Let’s vote. Who is in favor of accepting Borko Stefanović’s proposal to recommend to the Parliament to form an Investigative Committee? Twelve in favor. Who is against? Three.

In response to all the evidence presented in the series Patriotic Theft, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić stated that his government would investigate and prevent all future abuses, while Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić declared that the people of Serbia must know how their money was spent, and that proper oversight would be established from now on.

While representatives of the state and relevant institutions responded by promising to investigate all abuses, Serbian political leaders from Kosovo, at a joint session where a resolution was unanimously adopted, condemned the evidence presented in the Insider show. Representatives of all parties in Kosovo—DS, DSS, SPS, SNS, URS, SNV, SRS, Socialist Movement, PUPS, and local civic groups—voted for this resolution.

Joint Session of the Assemblies of Four Municipalities in Northern Kosovo, October 19

Resolution of the Assembly: We condemn the orchestrated campaigns by some media, such as B92, for the media demonization of the entire Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, with particular emphasis on the Serbs in the northern part of the Province, regarding the use of budget funds, with the aim of breaking the unity of the citizens and confronting them with other citizens of the Republic of Serbia.

Political leaders from Kosovo were joined by business owners from northern Kosovo, who, immediately after the first episode, demanded the show Insider be taken off the air and threatened to file a joint lawsuit by 19 business owners due to alleged false information presented in Insider. To date, no lawsuit has been filed.

Instead of providing answers or explanations for the evidence that an average of €650,000 a day has been allocated from Serbia’s budget to Kosovo for various purposes, but with little to no oversight for the past 12 years, Insider journalists who have worked on this topic for a year have been labeled “paid agents of Soros and Thaçi.” The Insider legal team has filed multiple lawsuits in recent days due to the false accusations made against B92 journalists.

Informal groups, intertwined political and criminal interests, and a system that Belgrade has not managed to control for years are defended with patriotic slogans, keeping Serbia in a perpetual state of emergency or at a “crucial moment for the future and defense of Serbdom” for the past 12 years. Any attempt to expose corruption is labeled as the “demonization of all Serbs,” while certain individuals build business empires.

As a result, nearly all budget spending goes unchecked, and state privileges have turned into a means for personal enrichment. Thus, when it was announced that administrative crossings could be monitored, leaders of Kosovo Serbs announced new barricades.

Political leaders of the Serbs in northern Kosovo, including representatives of almost all parties, stated two weeks ago at a joint session of the four municipalities held in Leposavić that they find the establishment of integrated crossings between Serbia and Kosovo, which would include both Serbian and Albanian customs officers, unacceptable. Business owners in the north joined this position, sending a clear and unified message to the Serbian government, which had announced days earlier that integrated crossings would need to be established, that they would not accept the agreement between Belgrade and Priština.

B92: The lack of such oversight is indeed a problem, as it turns out that once again, politics outweighs the financial losses that the state of Serbia incurs.

Oliver Ivanović, former State Secretary in the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija: "That’s why we entered into negotiations that led to some form of integrated border management, meaning both our customs officer and theirs will be in the same space, which will eliminate duplicate invoices and prevent this type of manipulation."

Current government representatives justify their actions by saying they must implement the agreement signed by the previous government, while representatives of the former government claim that the new government could annul the agreement if they find it harmful. The essence is that once again, each side is shifting responsibility to the other, while no one dares to declare that control must be established at the crossings. The reason for boycotting integrated crossings, according to Serbian political leaders from Kosovo and local businesspeople, is that this would sever Kosovo from Serbia. This was the official reason for the barricades last year, but it turned out that some individuals who organized the barricades were actually protecting their business interests.

Joint session of the assemblies of four municipalities in northern Kosovo, Leposavić, October 18, 2012.

Our assemblies’ and citizens’ stance that they will not accept the establishment of borders with the Republic of Serbia and the introduction of customs at the administrative crossings of Jarinje and Brnjak has been known for some time and has not changed, so the four municipalities mentioned, their representatives, and citizens will not participate in this.

Dragiša Milović, DSS, Mayor of Zvečan: "As citizens, we will not participate in all this. Someone may try to divide us by force, to set up borders, but we have the right to peacefully, democratically fight to remain what we are—a part of the state of Serbia."

Milan Ivanović, President of the Serbian National Council of Northern Kosovo and Metohija: "With these agreements, we lose our identity, name, surname, freedom, and the chance to remain and survive here."

Marko Jakšić, DSS: "If you want Kosovo and Metohija as part of the state of Serbia, you cannot have Borko’s agreements. The northern part and indeed all of Kosovo must remain part of the state of Serbia. If we remain united and firm, believe me, no one can harm us."

Representatives of the DSS are the only ones who refused to answer questions regarding the uncontrolled spending of funds from the Serbian budget allocated to Kosovo on various grounds during their time in power. Instead of answers, they stated that they do not cooperate with B92 due to the Insider series on the prime minister’s assassination and on the Kolubara theft. Insider journalists’ attempts to obtain answers at the press conference were unsuccessful.

B92: Irena Stević, Insider B92. By ignoring the evidence presented in Insider, is the DSS protecting theft and uncontrolled spending of budget funds, or individuals named in the episodes?

Slobodan Samardžić, DSS: "Please, ma’am, did you bring a letter from your director, or someone? Let me remind you, the DSS sent a letter to your director two years ago requesting clarification about certain campaigns B92 conducted against the DSS. Until that letter, that clarification, and explanation arrives, we will not cooperate with B92."

B92: By persistently refusing, under the excuse that the DSS does not cooperate with B92, are DSS officials actually avoiding answering questions?

Samardžić: "You see, every question is legitimate and suitable for a press conference, but I’m simply asking if you brought the letter. We’ll answer you, no problem, just to clarify these things..."

B92: No, I didn’t bring it, I already said that. I gave you a clear answer.

Samardžić: Then no response. Simply, we’re not cooperating. The press conference continues…

B92: I’m not interrupting. I’m a journalist; this conference exists because of us, after all.

Samardžić: You don’t have… you don’t have the floor, ma’am… please…

B92: I don’t have the floor?!

Samardžić: Please, anyone else with a question…

B92: Can I... now?

Samardžić: If there are no other questions…

B92: But I do have a question.

Samardžić: Well, you can’t. You can’t because we’re not cooperating with you.

While the DSS is the loudest in condemning the implementation of the agreement on integrated border management, it avoids mentioning that it was the government of Vojislav Koštunica that signed the CEFTA agreement in 2006, thus making Serbia part of the Central European and Eastern European Free Trade Zone. At the time, the signatory for Kosovo was the UNMIK administration, meaning Serbia indirectly recognized that, concerning Kosovo, it was dealing with a separate customs territory.

B92: Why is it difficult for us to admit that it is a separate customs zone?

Dejan Pavićević, head of the negotiation team for talks with Priština: We have absolutely no issue; we acknowledge that it’s a separate customs territory, considering certain geographical and other factors.

B92: What other factors?

Dejan Pavićević: Well, those other factors include ethnic aspects related to the population. You have the north, which is ethnically Serbian, and you can’t…

B92: But what does that have to do with it being in Kosovo and it being a separate customs zone?

Dejan Pavićević: But we must support our people.

Nebojša Jović, President of the Serbian National Council for Northern Kosovska Mitrovica: Albanians are being stationed at the crossings in the north. This is unacceptable for us. If we don’t recognize the independent state of Kosovo, which is our full right, we can’t accept any instrument or person who personifies that state at these two…

B92: Why is this unacceptable here but not at Merdare?

Jović: We have no influence at Merdare. We would do the same there, but we can’t influence it. I feel for the Serbs south of the Ibar River; they say, “we are…” In the situation they’re in, they can’t resist in the same way we can. We’re not better or braver than them, but by circumstances, our strategic—let’s say, geostrategic—position allows us to say what we will and won’t accept.

The true motivation behind the demands of Kosovo Serb leaders, which every Serbian government is essentially forced to meet or risk being branded as treasonous, is best illustrated by last year’s barricades at the crossings with Kosovo. Back then, too, political leaders of Kosovo Serbs, along with business interests, urged the local Serbian population to physically block the alleged secession of Kosovo.

At the same time, those who have been setting conditions for every Serbian government for years are also involved in business and have registered companies, either in their own names or in the names of their family members, in the Kosovo business registry, as you saw in the previous episode. Additionally, it remains a state secret that one of the main organizers of last year’s barricades—which led to Serbia losing its EU candidacy in December—was, in fact, Zvonko Veselinović.

Every two weeks, rallies are held in support of Veselinović in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica. Veselinović was arrested in December last year and charged with the illegal appropriation of 32 trucks from Hypo Leasing.

According to Insider’s investigation, Veselinović has built a business empire over the past few years since the VAT exemption for goods going from Serbia to Kosovo. According to data from an investigation known to Serbian authorities and led by UNMIK, he was involved in smuggling oil from Serbia into Kosovo. He worked alongside Albanian criminal circles, including Mentor Bećiri, the godfather of Ekrem Luka. This investigation against Veselinović was later dropped.

Despite all this, many in northern Kosovo and Serbia consider him a patriot who protects the interests of Serbia and the Serbs. Many people use these support rallies to send a message to the Serbian government that they will not accept the implementation of the Brussels Agreement.

Protest “Freedom for Zvonko,” Kosovska Mitrovica, October 1, 2012.

Boban Kovačević, Secretary of the Serbian-Slavic Solidarity Association “Ščerbina”: “God be with you. We gathered under the organization of the People’s Movement Otadžbina for freedom, for our brother Zvonko.”

Borislav Pelević, Member of Parliament: “No implementation of the Brussels Agreement. We won’t allow it.”

Kovačević: “First, Mr. Goran Petronijević, whom you know as an advocate for Serbs worldwide, including our Radovan Karadžić, was supposed to speak. He sent us a letter: ‘Treason is the greatest curse, and history is full of evidence that treason has never benefited anyone. Hang in there a bit longer, because Zvonko is enduring an unjust sentence and slander.’”

B92: Is Zvonko Veselinović a patriot?

Jović: Zvonko Veselinović? In my opinion, yes. A patriot, a good father, a good husband. You specifically asked, so yes, in my opinion, he is a patriot.

B92: And what about cooperation with Mentor Bećiri?

Jović: I don’t know who you’re talking about. Who is it?

B92: Mentor Bećiri.

Jović: And who is Mentor Bećiri? I honestly don’t know.

B92: I find it hard to believe you don’t know…

Jović: No, I really don’t know Mentor Bećiri. Cooperation could only happen if it would benefit both our people and theirs. But regarding any friendship or other connections, I genuinely don’t know.

B92: So are you saying that Zvonko Veselinović and Mentor Bećiri cooperated to bring reconciliation between the two communities?

Jović: I’m not saying anything. I asked who Mentor Bećiri was because I wasn’t sure; he’s probably a criminal, right? In that case, I doubt they collaborated.

Zvonko Veselinović is a prime example of how so-called patriots, under the guise of defending "Serbdom" and with slogans like "Kosovo is Serbia," exploit the situation of Serbs in Kosovo to rally the entire state in defense of their business interests. The public impression left was that unarmed people on the barricades were defending Serbia. However, according to Insider’s investigation, the reality is quite different.

The majority of the Serbian population in Kosovo barely survives, while a few individuals have managed to become wealthy over the past few years, thanks to state decisions. These are the very individuals who oppose the establishment of unified control at the crossings between Serbia and Kosovo. Last year’s barricades initially received support from the then Serbian government.

B92: It seems these barricades are protecting certain financial interests…

Goran Bogdanović, Minister for Kosovo and Metohija, 2008–2012: I wouldn’t agree with that. I think at that time, people were simply motivated by the desire to prevent Kosovo institutions from establishing themselves in northern Kosovo, especially not through unilateral, violent actions. Of course, if there are certain things happening illegally, then such a perception, as you’ve just pointed out, would be understandable.

Borislav Stefanović, former head of the Belgrade negotiating team: To say that the barricades were protecting smuggling is exactly the kind of thing they say in Priština, and it’s completely untrue.

B92: Were you aware of what else you might have been defending by going to the barricades?

Stefanović: No. I don’t see what I was defending beyond what I just told you. Plus, we weren’t opposing control of the boundary but were defending against a politically devastating unilateral move by Priština to impose its institutions in northern Kosovo and Metohija outside of any agreement, in the midst of ongoing dialogue. That’s what we were defending.

Milovan Drecun, Chairman of the Committee for Kosovo and Metohija in the Serbian Parliament: Are you trying to discredit the entire story of the barricades and the Serbian resistance, or just suggesting…

B92: That they were being used for certain people’s interests…

Drecun: No, that’s absolutely not true. That assessment is not only unobjective but also extremely malicious. Those people were defending their right to survival, resisting Priština’s violent actions. Do you remember those ROSU units marching to establish control over that area by force? They weren’t being exploited by anyone. It’s possible that the situation was exploited by some individuals for personal gain.

While local Serbs spent months on the barricades last year to prevent the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, Zvonko Veselinović’s machinery—excavators, bulldozers, and trucks—was building alternative routes for trucks and trailers to pass without any oversight.

Borislav Pelević, an SNS official and a member of the Parliamentary Committee for Kosovo at the time of the interview, claims that, as he noted, his friend Veselinović wasn’t doing this to smuggle goods from Serbia to Kosovo, but to help Serbs who were cut off from Serbia due to the barricades.

Pelević: The people of northern Kosovo and Metohija are very grateful to him, because without his machinery, his bulldozers, and his trucks, they simply would not have had any connection to their homeland Serbia and would not have been able to get basic supplies.

There are four administrative crossings for commercial goods between Serbia and Kosovo. One of them is the Rudnica crossing on the Serbian side. Two kilometers away, on the Kosovo side, this crossing is called Jarinje, where EULEX personnel and, since last September, Kosovo customs officers are stationed.

The second crossing is called Tabalije on the Serbian side and Brnjak on the Kosovo side. 

Due to the placement of barricades and various incidents, these two crossings are the most well-known entry points from Serbia to Kosovo in the Serbian public. These two crossings connect Serbia with northern Kosovo, and according to Insider’s investigation, establishing unified control—including both Serbian and Kosovo customs—would threaten the business interests of certain individuals in northern Kosovo.

An indicator of this is the fact that, at the other two crossings, Merdare and Končulj, both Serbian and Kosovo customs have been present for years, and it hasn’t caused any issues, even though national policy regards all of Kosovo—not just northern Kosovo—as part of Serbia.

However, Insider’s investigation suggests that the northern Kosovo crossings are essential for certain businesspeople because, for example, at the crossing from Serbia in Rudnica, just before Jarinje, there is an alternate route that bypasses the EULEX checkpoint located only two kilometers away. After that, several illegal routes lead to areas with no oversight, allowing goods from Serbia, exempt from VAT because they are destined for Kosovo, to either be smuggled back into Serbia—thus harming the Serbian budget—or smuggled south into Kosovo in cooperation with Albanian parties, which damages Kosovo’s budget.

Some of these illegal roads were actually built by the Serbian state years ago, under the pretext of making life easier for Kosovo Serbs, but they quickly turned into routes for smuggling excise goods, primarily oil.

B92: So, the state built an alternate route that fuel trucks use?

Bogdanović: No, no, no… I wouldn’t look at it that way. When the state built—or rather repaired—certain alternate routes, it certainly didn’t intend to aid smugglers or anyone…

B92: That’s clear, but who can guarantee that it wasn’t exploited for criminal activities?

Bogdanović: Well, I can’t claim it wasn’t exploited for criminal purposes.

Another fact indicating that certain individuals have exploited Kosovo Serbs is the strategic placement of the barricades defended by local Serbs. In practice, this meant that the administrative crossing on the Serbian side, Rudnica, was functioning normally. In the area between this point and the EULEX checkpoint, barricades were erected, as well as on the Kosovo side approaching Jarinje. This setup allowed businesspeople to continue obtaining certificates exempting them from VAT in Serbia, as they could still declare goods at Rudnica despite the barricades. From there, they could use alternate routes to either avoid Kosovo customs and smuggle goods into Kosovo or return them to Serbia.

Pelević: The establishment of barricades has nothing to do with VAT. Kosovo and Metohija citizens of Serbian nationality set up barricades to prevent Priština from consolidating Kosovo's independence and to prevent the separation of northern Kosovo from the rest of Serbia.

Pelević later left the SNS due to disagreements with the new government’s policy on Kosovo. Milovan Drecun, an SNS official, now leads the Committee for Kosovo and Metohija.

Drecun: What’s the issue? I ask again, what was being defended by those barricades?

B92: I’m asking you…

Drecun: The Serbs were defending themselves against Priština’s violent actions.

B92: But it was the same people who in 2005 advocated for the removal of VAT for Kosovo who called them to the barricades.

Drecun: So what?

B92: The decree removing VAT for Kosovo, or rather, eliminating VAT control for Kosovo, enabled extensive abuses in the north…

Drecun: You had a situation where Priština launched a violent action, and the people tried to resist it; you remember what happened then…

B92: It wasn’t the people trying to resist; it was those same people who…

Drecun: No, that’s incorrect information.

B92: It’s not incorrect information…

Drecun: Who stopped it? You don’t understand the mechanism by which the self-defense of Serbs operates.

The barricades, which were supported last year by representatives of the then Serbian government, came about after several events. First, in mid-July 2011, negotiations between Belgrade and Priština over Kosovo customs stamps failed because Serbia refused to accept Kosovo’s state symbols. In response, Priština decided to ban Serbian goods and block Serbian trucks and other freight vehicles from entering Kosovo. The first incidents occurred on July 25, 2011, when Kosovo customs officials, with the support of the ROSU police unit, attempted to unilaterally seize the administrative crossings at Jarinje and Brnjak to control the entry of Serbian goods. In response, Serbs set up barricades, blocking all main and other roads. Another crisis in northern Kosovo became a pretext for the involvement of representatives from right-wing organizations and hooligans at the administrative crossings.

Oliver Ivanović, July 2011: "The messages from the Serbs will be very, very clear, and I fear they may be painful."

Borislav Stefanović, July 2011: "We Serbs have to cross logs (barricades)..."

Goran Bogdanović, July 2011: "We cannot accept unilateral decisions; we cannot accept changes to the situation on the ground."

Ivica Dačić, July 2011: "This is a storm. This is an armed attack on Serbs in the north."

After last year’s incidents at Jarinje, KFOR commander Erhard Drews stated he had footage showing Zvonko Veselinović as the main organizer of the violence at the barricades. This footage has not yet been made public. At the time, Veselinović claimed that the West, with the help of its allies in Serbia, was conducting a campaign against him.

Zvonko Veselinović, for Svet Plus, October 2011:
"This is a major smear campaign, and I believe that Čedomir Jovanović and Vuk Drašković have been tasked by either Albanian services or American ones—I'm not sure which—to shift the blame onto someone so that KFOR soldiers wouldn’t be held accountable."

B92: Was Zvonko Veselinović organizing the barricades?
Nebojša Jović: You’re turning Zvonko into some kind of superman, but he’s just a normal guy, a regular citizen of this city, like everyone else. I don’t want to get into this. I’m just saying what I know. If you truly have evidence, I’ll join the next discussion, even over the phone.

The incident at Jarinje occurred on September 27. First, KFOR troops placed soil and barbed wire to block an alternative route that bypassed the EULEX checkpoint and had been used for smuggling for years. This road runs right next to the KFOR base.

Jović: We retreated as much as we could, but the worst part is when we hit a wall, they’d tell us to take another step. But we couldn’t step back any further. We had no choice but to move toward instead of retreating. That’s how they pushed us. That answers your question about why people were outraged. You’re closing off the alternative road that allows us to bring in supplies…
B92: But it’s also used for smuggling…
Jović: But not just for smuggling. Stop the smuggling; I have nothing against that.

The incident started after a group of people, many of them wearing hoodies, approached the blockade. A truck was also brought in, intending to drag away the wire fence with a cable. Insider obtained photos clearly showing a group of people in black hoodies near the truck. Among them were Žarko and Zvonko Veselinović.

Pelević: Let me tell you something you might not know, something the public doesn’t know because it’s being deliberately omitted. He was there during the Jarinje fire, alongside Borko Stefanović and Goran Bogdanović. So, if Zvonko set Jarinje on fire, then Borko Stefanović and Goran Bogdanović did as well because they were together.

B92: So why was Zvonko Veselinović at the checkpoint, on the barricades, in your company?
Stefanović: In whose company?
B92: He said he was at the barricades with you and Minister Bogdanović during the incidents…
Stefanović: He may have said that, but I didn’t see anyone, nor do I know this person or would recognize him. If you’re asking whether we had any cooperation, acquaintance, or communication, the answer is no. I can confidently state this, not only for myself but also for Minister Bogdanović.

In July, during the incidents, government representatives claimed that Zvonko Veselinović had no connection to the barricades.

Ivica Dačić, 2011: The idea that Zvonko Veselinović is leading the Serbian resistance is an absolute lie, falsehood, stupidity, and a harmful statement, whoever made it.

Goran Bogdanović, 2011: I cannot accept that those women, sitting on the barricades, or the people there, they just do not look to me like individuals who could fall under the influence of some criminal giving them orders. I say this perhaps emotionally, and I think you completely understand me. I was with those people, and my family is also on the barricades.

B92: Why is what happened considered a state secret?
Bogdanović: I agree that it cannot be a state secret.

However, it turned out that it was indeed classified as a state secret. The following events serve as evidence for this conclusion.

The barricades were set up in July. Just two months later, in September, when KFOR forces closed one of the illegal routes leading from Serbia to Kosovo, new incidents occurred. Seven Serbs and four KFOR soldiers were injured. Reports in Serbia read: "At least seven Serbs were wounded by gunfire at the Jarinje crossing. Many were shot while rescuing the injured, who were hit while standing by the barricades. KFOR troops fired automatic weapons at unarmed civilians."

KFOR stated that this was untrue, claiming instead that they used stun grenades and rubber bullets, while KFOR troops had been fired upon with small-caliber firearms. On the day of the shooting, negotiations between Belgrade and Priština on administrative crossings were scheduled to take place in Brussels.

In response to the incident, the Parliamentary Security Committee held a meeting a few days later. Members were informed by Serbian intelligence services about who was behind the Jarinje incident. However, the meeting was closed to the public, and all attendees were obligated, as is the norm in closed sessions of the Security Committee, not to disclose the information they were given.

Nevertheless, SPO President Vuk Drašković went public, revealing details he learned during the closed session.

Vuk Drašković, October 2011, TV B92:
"I cannot understand why the Security Committee was presented with the full truth about what happened that day, only for the decision to be made that the public should not know the truth and instead live in a lie. Right next to the administrative crossing, an alternative crossing was dug, practically burying the KFOR base. There was no reaction. KFOR troops came out, unrolled barbed wire, and closed the crossing. Soon, according to information from our security services, and I quote them, a group of organized individuals—not yet the general public, who would later join, misled by those individuals—arrived. These individuals did not tell the public what was going on. They arrived with a truck, hit the wire, brought wire cutters to cut it, and attacked KFOR soldiers. Physical altercations ensued, with pushing, during which an American soldier's rifle was seized—a rifle that was not even recovered by the time of the Security Committee meeting."

Insider sent an inquiry to the Security Information Agency (BIA), then led by Saša Vukadinović, asking whether BIA had knowledge as early as the beginning of October the previous year that Zvonko Veselinović and his brother were behind the incidents at Jarinje, and why it was decided to withhold information about who was responsible for the incident from the public.

In its response to Insider, BIA stated that regarding the question of whether Zvonko Veselinović was behind the incidents, they regretted that they could not provide a concrete answer as it involved operational data. BIA explained that the session was closed to the public because the National Assembly decided so. In its correspondence with Insider, BIA stated that it was not in a position to assess the public impression left by the session, especially since it was not a session involving only the Agency, but also the Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs, the Police Director, and the directors of three security services.

B92: When did you find out who Zvonko Veselinović was?
Stefanović: Well, you know, I heard his name mentioned several times while I was in Kosovo and Metohija, because, apparently, a lot of people know and talk about him. If you’re asking, I also heard it in the context of threats. So, if that’s what you’re asking…
B92: What do you mean by threats?
Stefanović: Well, there were threats, you know, that I’d be better off not coming, that I wouldn’t leave alive.
B92: Because of the VAT refunds?
Stefanović: I don’t know why. I think it’s better to say it’s because of the dialogue with Priština, which the Serbian people don’t accept—it sounds nicer, doesn’t it? Nobody will openly tell you they’re against VAT refunds, but many people will publicly oppose the results of the dialogue with Priština.

However, the burning of barricades and the incidents that culminated in September led to Serbia not receiving EU candidate status in December. The government had supported the barricades for months.

In November, under apparent pressure as Serbia sought to obtain candidate status in December, then-President Boris Tadić made a policy shift and called on local Serbs to remove the barricades.

Boris Tadić, President of Serbia, November 29, 2011:
"I call on the political representatives of the Serbs in northern Kosovo, who have their legitimacy as they were elected in elections, to do everything to remove the barricades because they endanger, above all, the lives of citizens and fail to secure a single national interest."

Vojislav Koštunica, DSS, December 1, 2011:
"The barricades in Kosovo didn’t come out of the idle whim of the people living there; they found themselves in an unenviable position but simultaneously demonstrated a certain degree of responsibility. They are defending both themselves and the state in Kosovo."

In 2005, the government of Vojislav Koštunica, when it decided to abolish VAT on all goods going to Kosovo, similarly assured the public that the regulation was introduced to help Serbs in Kosovo, even though, in reality, they didn’t receive any real assistance from it. The price of goods remained the same as in central Serbia, where VAT was paid. Meanwhile, Serbian and Albanian businessmen, criminals, and certain individuals used the situation to amass enormous wealth. At the same time, the majority of Serbs who remained in Kosovo barely survived, and the only aid, as shown in this series, was a single loaf of bread once a week.

When businessmen from Kosovo, together with Marko Jakšić and Milan Ivanović, practically negotiated the abolition of VAT for goods going to Kosovo during meetings with Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, the head of the Coordination Center was still Nebojša Čović.

Nebojša Čović, Head of the Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija, 2001-2005: "I was already on my way out at that time. I was present at certain meetings where the Serbian National Council exerted the greatest pressure to abolish VAT."

B92: And how did you interpret that at the time?
Čović: Well, you know, on the one hand, when you look at it at first glance, this VAT decision, as they presented it, gives the impression that it’s about separating Kosovo and Metohija, but on the other hand, that’s not true. That’s not true. However, the government signed it under that pressure.

In 2011, due to a series of abuses, the government of Mirko Cvetković decided, near the end of its term, to reinstate VAT on oil, cars, and phone cards. However, these goods could still be exempt from VAT in various ways, requiring more certificates and stricter control of documentation.

B92: You said that reinstating VAT eliminated a source of financing for criminals...
Stefanović: No, I said it eliminated it to a large extent.
B92: To a large extent. But how is it possible that you only realized this in July?
Stefanović: I see you keep asking why something hasn’t been done before now. We could now discuss why so much hasn’t been done concerning Kosovo and Metohija, but then you would have to bring other people into this chair, those who established that system.

Drecun: The abolition of VAT was a well-intentioned effort by the government, one of the few mechanisms available to help the Serbian people survive and stay in Kosovo. If there are major abuses and prices of goods aren’t being reduced, then this mechanism should be reexamined, and another way should be found to help Serbs.

The government of Mirko Cvetković reinstated VAT on oil, phone cards, and cars only at the end of its term. All other goods sent from Serbia to Kosovo remained exempt from VAT, under the pretext of helping Serbs in Kosovo. However, according to Insider’s investigation, the majority of Serbian companies actually sold goods to companies owned by Albanians in the southern part of Kosovo.

An analysis of official data collected by Insider in accordance with the law shows that, for example, the food trade grew from 2005, when VAT was abolished, to 2011, in some years dramatically so.
The government thus exempted goods from VAT under the guise of helping vulnerable Serbs, but in most cases, these goods reached them through Albanian intermediaries.

In 2006, according to official data, food products worth just over 32 million euros were shipped to Kosovo. The following year, this trade grew slightly, and by 2008, it had surged to 54 million euros. By 2010, the total food trade had reached 95 million euros.
Insider investigated which Serbian companies had the largest volume of trade with Kosovo.

According to official data, the company Invej, owned by businessman Predrag Ranković “Peconi”, was among the companies that immediately, in 2005, when VAT was abolished for goods sent from Serbia to Kosovo, recorded high trade volumes. Predrag Ranković owns factories producing soap, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, cooking oil, and biscuits.

According to our investigation, the exclusive distributor for Invej’s products in Kosovo is the company Elkos, based in Peć. The owner of Elkos, Ramiz Keljmendi, is reportedly the third-richest person in Kosovo according to Albanian media. In the Kosovo business registry, Elkos is listed with a capital of 20 million euros. Keljmendi is also a member of the Kosovo Assembly and part of the parliamentary group Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, led by Ramush Haradinaj, one of the former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Representatives from Invej told us that they supply their products to Albanians under the CEFTA agreement and that, for them, this is simply a standard export business.

Official data from the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, which collects information from Serbian customs and the tax administration, shows that among the major suppliers of goods since 2006 is the company Swisslion Takovo, owned by Rodoljub Drašković.

According to Swisslion representatives, they also have exclusive distributors operating in the southern, Albanian part of Kosovo. For a time, this was the company Gljareva from Klina, owned by Bujar Morina, according to the business registry. Currently, goods from Serbia are delivered to the company Swisskos, registered in Priština, with Džavit Morina listed as the owner.

The Danube Foods Group, which includes Bambi Banat, Imlek, Knjaz Miloš, and Subotica Dairy and is owned by the investment fund Salford, has been among the largest suppliers of goods to Kosovo every year. Insider obtained data showing that Salford sells its products to various companies. In several cases in 2010, the buyer was the company Rad from Zubin Potok, established in November 2009. Its financial report states it had zero employees.

As for Bambi, its shipments in July 2011 were intended for the company Elkos from Peć, the same company to which Predrag Ranković “Peconi” also sells goods. Elkos is owned by Ramiz Keljmendi, a member of parliament from Ramush Haradinaj's party.

Interestingly, one of the largest food producers, Delta, does not appear among the companies with the highest turnover with Kosovo. According to Delta Agrar’s response to Insider, over a seven-year period, they shipped a total of 2,000 tons of goods to Kosovo, worth 1.6 million euros.

Bojan Stojanović, Mayor of Gračanica: "Has anyone opened a production facility here? A distribution center? It would be good if Kosovo Serbs became representatives of Serbian companies’ products, which would be logical, while Kosovo Albanians were distributors. When you have circulation—people with money coming here, buying from Kosovo Serbs, and selling to the rest of Kosovo—some of the money would stay here."

B92: And what is the reality?
Bojan Stojanović: "The reality is... Kosovo Serbs are paying 10% more for Plazma, their own brand, and Eurocrem because they buy it from Kosovo Albanians. The distributors are exclusively Kosovo Albanians."

The Karić company also established cooperation with Albanian firms. According to official data from 2005, Astra Simit, a subsidiary of the Karić company, became one of the largest sellers of goods to Kosovo, with a turnover of $4.3 million, equivalent to approximately 3.6 million euros at the time.

That year, following a decision by the Serbian government, goods going to Kosovo were exempted from VAT. Astra Simit became one of Bogoljub Karić’s most profitable enterprises, dealing in top-ups and mobile phone cards.

At the beginning of 2006, Astra Simit went bankrupt following a criminal complaint filed by the tax police. An indictment against Bogoljub Karić was only issued in 2010 for abuses in Mobtel, but the trial has yet to begin. The Mobtel affair arose after press reports about a contract signed between Mobtel and the Kosovo company Mobilkos, which was backed by controversial businessman Ekrem Luka, a financier of Ramush Haradinaj's party.

The abolition of VAT on goods going to Kosovo thus generated significant profits for those who had access to tax-free goods—individuals from both the Serbian and Kosovo sides.

For 12 years, under the pretense of aiding the Serbian population, an average of €650,000 per day has been sent from Serbia to Kosovo with almost no oversight. Meanwhile, the Serbian budget has been deprived of approximately €300 million in unpaid VAT from Kosovo, a part of its territory. Every attempt to establish control has led to outright rebellion by the so-called Serbian leaders in northern Kosovo.

Aleksandar Popov, Director of the Center for Regionalism: "Until an agreement was reached on establishing integrated border management, this was an 'Eldorado' for a number of so-called controversial businessmen—one of whom is currently in prison—allowing them to collect substantial duties and revenue at the expense of Serbian taxpayers, which caused great losses to the Serbian budget. However, the other citizens of northern Kosovo did not benefit significantly from this."

For years, the undefined status and uncontrolled borders benefited individuals who enriched themselves at the expense of the budget. This was possible because northern Kosovo has long held a specific status. Since 1999, the military and police have withdrawn from Kosovo, along with many judicial institutions and other agencies responsible for enforcing the law.

In the meantime, a specific elite formed in northern Kosovo. On one side are politicians defending the status quo, and on the other, members of various criminal groups protecting their businesses from oversight. Serbia has virtually minimal control in this area.

Pavićević: "The state shouldn’t be about power; it should enforce the rule of law."
B92: "Does it enforce it in northern Kosovo?"
Pavićević: "You know, to fully enforce the rule of law, you must have instruments—let’s call them instruments of coercion."

Since 2000, six governments have come and gone, yet the policy of allocating funds for Kosovo has remained unchanged. Funds from all citizens have been sent with little to no control under the guise of aiding the vulnerable Serbian population. In reality, the allocation of these funds was handled by party officials who alternated in power both nationally and locally. The power to manage public money created a new elite, especially in northern Kosovo.

Milorad Todorović, former Head of the Kosovo-Pomoravlje District: "Look at the leaders of Serbian institutions in northern Kosovo since 2002. It’s not hard to figure out. Just look at who has been in power from then until now—the conclusion is self-evident."

Funds from all Serbian citizens, averaging around €650,000 per day for years, were channeled after October 5, 2000, through the Coordination Center, headed from 2001 to 2005 by Nebojša Čović, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia until 2004 and leader of the Democratic Alternative party. He was succeeded by Sanda Rašković Ivić from DSS, who had previously been Deputy Head of the Coordination Center. During the DSS administration, records of state fund expenditures were archived, making them inaccessible to the public.

After the formation of Vojislav Koštunica's second government in 2007, the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija was established. Funds continued to be disbursed through various channels and from different budgetary institutions, making control of their spending nearly impossible. The minister was Slobodan Samardžić, a long-time advisor to Koštunica and Vice President of DSS.

When the government changed in 2008, Goran Bogdanović became the minister, serving a full term in office. Bogdanović is a member of the Democratic Party presidency.

One of the state secretaries responsible for the Coordination Center within the Ministry was Zvonko Stević, a member of the SPS.

When SPS, SNS, and URS formed the government in July, the Ministry for Kosovo was abolished, and the Office for Kosovo and Metohija was established, led by Aleksandar Vulin, the leader of the Socialist Movement and a member of the SNS-led coalition. Vulin was one of the founders of JUL in the 1990s, serving as its spokesperson and vice president under Mirjana Marković.

Regarding local governance in Kosovo, all major political parties over the years, while Serbian citizens' money was spent without oversight, have at some point had the opportunity to request funds for the Kosovo territory. In the municipalities of Zubin Potok and Zvečan, DSS officials Slaviša Ristić and Dragiša Milović have held office since 2002. DSS official Velimir Bojović led the municipality of Leposavić until 2008. The DS held power for two years, with Branko Ninić serving as mayor. In July this year, the SNS took over leadership, with Dragiša Vasić from SNS as the mayor and Milomir Kuzmanović, an SPS member, as his deputy. The ruling coalition also includes DSS, SPS, PUPS, SRS, New Serbia, and the Socialist Movement.

In the municipality of Kosovska Mitrovica, a political council comprising representatives from DS and DSS was in charge starting in 2003. After the 2008 elections, DSS and the Radicals formed the government, but in 2010, the DS coalition took over. Just three months later, the coalition dissolved, and DSS-SNS formed a majority. In October 2010, Krstimir Pantić from SNS was elected mayor.

Saša Dedović, President of the SDPS Kosovo and Metohija Provincial Board: "Local authority is stronger than state authority because, locally, there is a strong party leading policies in one way or another. The state cannot prevent or counteract this, even if the policy is wrong. Moreover, they follow a non-confrontational approach. How do you oppose your own people, no matter their party? How do you tell people in Serbia, ‘We stopped this and that in Kosovska Mitrovica for such and such reasons,’ when they will then attack the state or government and claim it’s all a ploy to expel them? And so, they have developed a specific defensive system: the worse, the better."

While those in Belgrade have changed, deciding how much budget money would go to Kosovo, those labeled as Serbian leaders from Kosovo have played a significant role in local affairs for years. The most notable body gathering Serbs from Kosovo was the Serbian National Council (SNV), established in 1998 and headed by Bishop Artemije. Over the years, SNV members, some of whom switched parties, have been labeled by Serbian media as leaders of Serbs from Kosovo. Among the most notable were Milan Ivanović, Marko Jakšić, Oliver Ivanović, Ranđel Nojkić, Rada Trajković, Momčilo Trajković, and Vuko Antonijević.

Marko Jakšić and Milan Ivanović frequently appeared in dispatches sent by U.S. embassies in Belgrade and Priština to the State Department. According to these cables, both were banned from entering the United States. These classified cables and details about Jakšić and Ivanović were published by WikiLeaks.

One cable from 2007 states:
"It is believed that Ivanović and Jakšić were behind the decision by northern municipalities in June 2006 to sever ties with Kosovo institutions. They use their influence in the hospital to 'encourage' employees to participate in protests they organize. They control financial resources sent from Belgrade to northern Kosovo through the Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija, which contributes to their influence. Ivanović is considered more pragmatic compared to the violent and unpredictable Jakšić, whom many describe as the 'king' of northern Kosovo."

Marko Jakšić is considered one of the most influential people in northern Kosovo. He is a member of the DSS presidency and a representative of the party in the Serbian Parliament. For several years, he headed the Kosovska Mitrovica hospital, where his deputy was Milan Ivanović. Ivanović is the long-time president of the Serbian National Council of Northern Kosovo and ran in the 2008 elections with the DSS.

B92: We’ve been following the cables WikiLeaks published about northern Kosovo. Among other things, they describe Marko Jakšić as the "king" of northern Kosovo. Is that true?
Bogdanović: Well, I don’t know what to tell you. I mean, king? In what sense, king?
B92: We’re asking…
Bogdanović: I think... How can he be a king?
Oliver Ivanović, State Secretary of the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija (2008-2012): "He’s certainly not a king. We have a republic there; it would be hard for him to pass as a king."

B92: Who rules northern Kosovo?
Jović: The municipal assemblies of Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić, and Zubin Potok...
B92: What is the role of Marko Jakšić and Milan Ivanović in northern Kosovo?
Jović: Very significant, very significant. Jakšić is a respected orthopedic surgeon—if you have any injury, and he’s not there, people get worried and wonder if everything will be okay.
B92: We’re talking politically…
Jović: Speaking politically, considering their patriotic stance—though I know the term is contentious—Marko Jakšić, especially, along with Milan Ivanović, are indisputable political leaders.

Every Serbian government retreats in the face of demands from individuals in northern Kosovo who invariably invoke the Serbs still living there. At the same time, these Serbs receive no assistance from either local leaders or the Serbian state.

Drecun: You know what triggers paranoia? Do you know when paranoia strikes in the north?
B92: When?
Drecun: When heavily armed ROSU units of Hashim Thaçi march into northern Kosovo with weapons. That truly causes paranoia, especially among mothers who don’t know what to do with their children.
B92: We filmed mothers who don’t know what to do with their children because they receive no aid from Serbia while funds are being spent in Kosovo…
Drecun: That’s true, absolutely. I agree—it’s an uneven distribution of aid to Serbs, and that must be corrected.

As seen from the evidence presented in the "Patriotic" Theft series, which was gathered under the Freedom of Information Act, due to a lack of adequate oversight, it turns out that Serbian citizens have been paying for years for projects that were never completed. For example, they funded the purchase of Albanian apartments for internally displaced persons, but the apartments were distributed based on political affiliation, while the displaced remained in container settlements and refugee centers in Kosovo. Similarly, Serbian citizens funded the reconstruction of homes destroyed or damaged by earthquakes in the Kosovo Pomoravlje region, yet many homes remain unrestored to this day. About €3 million was paid in advance from the budget for the construction of a gerontology center and four buildings in Kosovska Mitrovica, but these sites remain empty fields because construction never even began.

Additionally, Serbian citizens fund the operation of fictitious public enterprises, while Serbs who have never been employed by state institutions have been forgotten by both the Serbian state and local authorities.

The essence of the "Patriotic Theft" series was to highlight that the funds allocated by Serbian citizens for 12 years—an average of around €650,000 per day—should actually reach those in Kosovo who truly need assistance.

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