This is how members of the security service received the order to stop monitoring journalist Slavko Ćuruvija on the day of his murder, April 11, 1999.

The journalist was killed about ten minutes later, when the area was clear, meaning there were no operatives from the Service following him, who could one day be inconvenient witnesses.

The fact that the Service was following the journalist on the day of the murder and that the central office ordered the surveillance to stop right before the killing was known as early as 2000, when the "Ćuran" file was removed from the Service.

This meant that, for a brief moment, the vow of silence within the Service was broken.

However, it would turn out in the years that followed that, despite the evidence, political will was still necessary to resolve the murder.

Drawing the target: The Untouchable Service

Fourteen years later, an indictment was brought against former members and leaders of the Security Service. The first progress was made only when the same people who were in power at the time of Ćuruvija’s murder returned to power.

That was why it was an important message: the crimes committed by the Service in the past would not go unpunished, and no one would ever again be allowed to target individuals.

It seemed that things would be different – but nothing has changed.

Twenty-four years after the murder and the lengthy court process, no verdict has been delivered, targets are being drawn again, and when darkness falls – omertà is assumed.

"Organized, planned, treacherously and brutally, a trap was set where Slavko Ćuruvija could not survive, and the killer could not miss," the prosecutor for organized crime said in his closing statement, asking the court for a final verdict, which now, 24 years later, still seems distant.

"I wouldn’t be surprised if the verdict is an acquittal. It’s very rare for anyone from the so-called civil sector of the Service to ever be convicted. It’s like a hydra with 1,000 heads: you cut one off, and ten more appear in its place," explains Slobodan Ružić, the Ćuruvija family's lawyer.

Over its long history, the Security Service has changed both its name and leadership. OZNA, UDBA, State Security, and now BIA, as it is called today.

The Service didn’t start killing in the 1990s – it has been doing so since its inception.

During the 1970s and 1980s, it organized and assassinated political emigrants abroad. Later, during Slobodan Milošević’s rule, it eliminated internal political opponents.

"The first thing that happened was the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija on April 11, 1999. So, what first came to my mind, and from talking to some people, I thought that the state was behind the murder, because who else would kill a journalist and media owner," added Ružić.

The murder of Slavko Ćuruvija, the murder on the Ibarska Highway where four officials of SPO – Vuk Drašković's political party – were killed, the murder of Milošević's once-close associate Ivan Stambolić, who was killed and buried in quicklime, the attempted assassination of Vuk Drašković in Budva.

All these are crimes in which members or associates of the State Security Service were involved, either directly or indirectly.

The reform of the service did not occur even after the democratic changes, and in 2003, Serbia's first democratically elected prime minister, Zoran Đinđić, was also killed. The role of the service in that murder was never even examined.

They remained untouchable.

"Governments changed, Serbia split into first and second, civic and non-civic, authoritarian and non-authoritarian, radicals became progressives, the democrats fragmented into 17 parties, there's no telling what didn’t happen in politics and political life. But in this part of the story, whether we protect our own so they don't fall because someone else fell because of them, or they were the product of someone falling by their own hand, being killed—this shows that some extraordinary organization still lives on and protects its own," said Voja Žanetić, a columnist for Ćuruvija's Telegraf and Evropljanin.

"I thought that after October 5, after the changes, all the leading people of the institutions, the security services, who harmed the people of Serbia by protecting Slobodan Milošević’s autocratic and pro-war regime, would be arrested and tried for everything they did," said B92 radio founder Veran Matić.

And they committed numerous crimes. The peak of the service's abuse came when Radomir Marković was in charge.

The pattern for these murders was always the same. The targets were marked by politicians and the media, and the service was engaged to monitor every move of the future victim, preparing the ground for the execution.

Often, the operatives in the field didn’t even know what was being planned, but they were obliged to report every detail to their superiors.

"The way they tracked Slavko Ćuruvija—when someone is of security interest, you’ll monitor them, and when they’re in conversation with someone, you’ll try to bug it, to hear it. You won't monitor someone 24 hours without interruption. A person is followed 24 hours if you intend to kill them, to learn their habits, their movements, who they meet, at what times, so you can choose the most convenient moment to do it," explained Dragan Bujošević, who was an assistant editor at the weekly NIN at the time.

"The order always comes from the very top, and it was given by Slobodan Milošević. The civilian sector of the service participates in the organization and execution of the murder, acting as logistical support and the brain of the operation, while the JSO, which is practically a military unit within the State Security Service, directly carries out the murders," explained lawyer Slobodan Ružić.

The Security Service was unique in that, in 1996, under Jovica Stanišić, it formed its own armed unit, the JSO, whose commander was Milorad Ulemek Legija, and its members were used for various dirty jobs on behalf of the state.

However, the darkest period of the service came with the appointment of Radomir Marković in 1998.

Without a day's work in the service, coming from public security as a family friend of Slobodan Milošević and Mirjana Marković, Radomir Marković became the new head.

The missed opportunity to reform the Service occurred immediately after the October 5th changes in 2000.

At that time, Vojislav Koštunica, as the president of Yugoslavia, took formal power from everyone in DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia).

He announced that there would be no revenge and kept Milošević’s head of State Security, Radomir Marković, until the formation of the first democratic government in January 2001.

“So, there was plenty of time to destroy a lot of documents, to destroy a lot of evidence, to arrange stories, to synchronize them, to warn everyone who could provide authentic testimonies to never do so—not just then, but ever,” said Veran Matić.

The removal and then arrest of Radomir Marković were among the first decisions of Zoran Đinđić's new democratic government.

However, it turned out, as reported by Insajder back in 2004, that on October 6, 2000, Radomir Marković had already ordered the chiefs of State Security centers across Serbia to burn documents that could later compromise them.

“They had all the time in the world to hide evidence, to intimidate witnesses, to explain to them that they should continue working in the Service, to remind them how powerful the Service was and that it wasn’t something to mess with. You know, as they say, their omertà—once in the Service, always in the Service,” said journalist Perica Gunjić, who worked with Slavko Ćuruvija at Borba and later at Telegraf.

Despite the destruction of evidence and the fact that no one has been held accountable for it to this day, one document was preserved, and some individuals decided to break the vow of silence imposed by the dark Service.

The Dossier

While the victory over Milošević’s regime was still being celebrated, in late October 2000, a State Security document about the secret surveillance of Slavko "Ćuruvija"—the Ćuran Dossier—was made public.

“That was a period when some structures within the security services could gather enough courage to leak some confidential information and documents, including that document,” said Miroslav Kos, one of the editors with whom Slavko Ćuruvija founded the daily newspaper Dnevni telegraf.

“The Ćuran Dossier is part of the diary of the Belgrade center of State Security. A section of that diary appeared in the mailbox of Nataša Kandić, describing two critical days that were key to the liquidation and murder of Slavko Ćuruvija,” said Veran Matić.

The Ćuran Dossier revealed that even during the NATO bombing, the security service was dealing with so-called internal enemies.

Members of the third department of State Security, who had been monitoring opposition leaders for years, followed every step of Slavko Ćuruvija in April 1999.

"At least 27 people who were tracking Ćuruvija day and night, in the middle of the bombing, had no other task but to follow him, now justifying it by claiming they were monitoring him because of his contacts with someone from the American Embassy. I mean, the basic logic was that at the time the American Embassy had been evacuated, and none of their representatives were even here," said Perica Gunjić.

The field operatives were simply following their boss's orders.

They didn’t know what was actually being prepared for Ćuruvija.

It was later revealed that the surveillance was directly overseen by the head of Belgrade’s State Security (DB), Milan Radonjić, who had been appointed just seven days earlier.

This was another precedent, as until then, field operatives were not obligated to report every detail to their superiors.

“What is very clear from that report is that the surveillance unit followed Slavko Ćuruvija in an unusual way, frequently reporting so-called changes. For example, the ‘subject’—as the person being followed is called—was sitting in one restaurant. When you typically report, you would say: he’s sitting in that restaurant, and next time you report when he moves to another place. But in this case, they reported everything—he's left, he's heading here, now he's going there,” said Ružić.

The Day of the Murder: "When the State Becomes a Killer of Its Citizens"

On that day, Slavko Ćuruvija and Branka Prpa went for a walk.

On their way back, they stopped at the „Kolarac“ restaurant, and after lunch, they headed toward the apartment on Lole Ribara Street.

All of this was being monitored and reported by the operatives.

They were instructed—report immediately if they head home; we may apply another measure. They reported, and then came the order—cease the measures and head towards Kalenić Market.

A few minutes later, 12 bullets were fired at Slavko Ćuruvija.

“When the state starts killing its citizens, you enter a kind of matrix system where it's unclear who did it in Serbia under the conditions of a state of emergency. When both civil and military authorities are in control, when nothing happens without being observed, when there are restrictions on movement and everything else, you ask yourself—in the middle of a war, who could have come to the street and shot Slavko Ćuruvija and then walked away,” said Branka Prpa, historian, author of articles in Evropljanin magazine, and Slavko Ćuruvija’s partner.

“The fact that the State Security (DB) organized the murder—we didn’t need the Ćuran document to prove that. The document is important as evidence, but everyone knew it—it couldn't have been carried out without DB’s control,” said Miroslav Kos.

“The diary clearly shows that the State Security Service, the Department of State Security, was behind the murder. The surveillance was meant to identify the moment when Slavko was approaching his building, and that’s when the command from the head, Radonjić, came for everyone to clear out. Then the killers appeared—no one was supposed to see them, and they carried out the execution,” said Veran Matić.

No one saw the killers, except for Branka Prpa, who was struck with a gun by one of the attackers, but it was clear to everyone that the state was behind the murder.

"Everyone knows that Slavko was killed by the state, meaning Milošević. Who else could it be? And Mira Marković. Before that, they published an article in Politika Ekspres titled 'Ćuruvija Welcomes NATO Bombs,' which was an absolute threat. That article was also read on RTS, during the news, and it was a clear message. Now they say they don’t know who did it? It’s terrifying when the state becomes the killer of its citizens," explained Branka Prpa.

"I remember Dragoljub Žarković's first wife at the funeral, there were so many people, which warmed us like the sun. At one point, I said to that woman, 'People have come here as if the government didn’t kill him,' and she looked at me and said, 'If the government hadn’t killed him, I wouldn’t have come.' What I mean is—everyone understood what had happened," said Ljiljana Smajlović.

Regarding the murder of a journalist in the middle of Belgrade during NATO bombing, many daily newspapers only reported a brief agency dispatch.

Blic published it on the tenth page, Novosti on the twelfth, with a short police statement saying that a murder had occurred and that they were intensively searching for the perpetrator.

However, Vreme magazine wanted to publish a longer article, but because wartime censorship was in effect, the then-editor Dragoljub Žarković had to inform the Ministry of Information, headed by Aleksandar Vučić at the time. He described the conversation in Dušan Mašić's book Talasanje Srbije:

“I called Vučić and told him, ‘We are going to publish a full page about Ćuruvija’s murder.’

He asked, ‘A full page?’ I said, ‘Yes, a full page. If you want Vreme to be trusted during wartime, we can’t publish a brief agency note when a colleague has been killed.’

He responded, ‘Well, I would like to see that.’

He wasn’t entirely indifferent. It was already the third week of the bombing, and he started to ‘let us be’ in a way, saying, ‘I won’t look at it. I have no reason to doubt you.’

He was pretending to be friendly. When I brought him the article about Ćuruvija, he looked at the page and read it, read it, and read it, and finally said, ‘Alright. No problem.’

At that moment, I felt two things. First, that Vučić was scared. He was personally afraid, and I think he had more reason to be afraid than the journalists.

Secondly, I sensed a kind of human disgust in Vučić towards such an act. That’s why I believe this wasn’t an act of state repression against the media, but rather an individual act of revenge."

Change of Government: The Search for "Justice" for the Crimes of the Nineties

When Vojislav Koštunica, as a joint DOS candidate, defeated Milosevic in the elections, a transitional government was formed at the republican level.

Key ministries did not have a single minister but rather a collegium, i.e. one representative each from the ranks of DOS, SPO, and Milošević's SPS.

"I thought there would be a swift reckoning with the past, in a way that justice would be served. But instead of confronting the past, instead of creating a process of discontinuity with the previous regime, space was left for some kind of continuity within what survived," said Veran Matić.

In such circumstances, the Poskok unit was formed at the MUP, with the aim, as managers from that time later testified, to shed light on crimes such as the murder of Ćuruvija, Ivan Stambolić and the assassination on the Ibarska highway.

And they worked on those cases, but in such a closed system and with destroyed traces - in slow motion.

Already in January 2001, after new parliamentary elections, a new government was formed, headed by Zoran Đinđić.

"That's when the investigation related to the murder and attempts to reconstruct the image of the man I saw began. I said, you know what, you are the only police in the world who believe that no matter how much time passes, the witness's memory is fresher, since you weren't there for a year and 9 months to show me the albums, now you remembered", said Branka Prpa.

"So, when the Ćuran Dossier appeared in public, several months had passed and it was surprising to me that there were still no serious activities. What the representatives of the politicians who came to power constantly promised, which is that they would be the first to solve certain political murders, among the first being the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija," said Veran Matić.

After the formation of the Government of Serbia, the POSKOK unit was reorganized into the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (UBPOK), a unit at the level of the police directorate.

Inspector Dragan Kecman:

UBPOK was a powerful force, filled with people who knew their job and could solve any case. The chief from UBPOK’s best period reported directly to the minister, with no intermediaries.

While professionals in the police were gathering evidence of involvement in crimes from the 1990s, both formal and informal centers of power, fearing imprisonment, prosecution, and the consequences that might follow, worked to find ways to stay protected.

"I won’t mention the name, but once, a man who was both a writer and a politician, told me at one point, ‘You know, the DOS will fall apart quickly.’ I asked why. This was during the time when DOS won 70 percent of the vote in Serbia. And he said, ‘Because they haven’t shed blood.’ I asked, ‘What do you mean by that?’ He said, ‘They weren’t involved in any so-called crimes, the kind that binds people together with a conspiracy of silence. That kind of crime makes them protect each other constantly, because if one speaks, they’re all doomed,’” recounted Dragan Bujošević.

While DOS was falling apart, the service was growing stronger.

On March 12, 2003, the first democratic prime minister, Zoran Đinđić, was assassinated.

Operation Sabre was launched, and all former senior officials of the police, military, and intelligence services were called in for questioning.

As part of investigations into political murders from the 1990s, Radomir Marković, who had been arrested back in 2001, was also questioned.

Radomir Marković, who was arrested back in 2001, was interrogated as part of several investigations into political murders during the nineties.

“I think it’s a great shame that, during Operation Sabre, Radomir Marković began to be interrogated in a way that would have led him to tell everything he knew. From what I understand, he spoke for three days before prosecutor Prijić. It’s clear he received a message from what we now call the ‘deep state,’ from all those who would be exposed by his testimony, to stop. A way to blackmail him was certainly found, and that has kept him silent to this day about numerous cases of assassinations and murders during his time as the head of the State Security Department,” said Veran Matić.

Even in the following years, no one spoke up.

The code of silence, or omerta, was stronger than the drive to uncover the truth. However, some individuals within the system were determined to see this case through to the end.

At that time, Inspector Kecman came into possession of a phone number.

It was quickly revealed that the number belonged to Ratko Romić, the chief intelligence officer of the Second Directorate of the State Security Department, and that he used it on the day Slavko Ćuruvija was murdered.

It was clear to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) officer leading the investigation that the service was protecting its own.

Dragan Kecman:

You know how the State Security Department operates? You ask them for Romić's number, and they give you some random, irrelevant one. The only way is to get Romić's number yourself and then ask for other numbers he used. Only then will they give them to you. When you ask for something descriptively, they give you a vague answer, never precise.

I have it in my notebook from that period, written on a slip of paper, on the back of which is the name of my colleague who handed it to me in passing, saying only, "Here’s the number."

The phone number wasn’t enough to track Romić’s movements on the day of Slavko Ćuruvija’s murder.

He needed to read data from the base stations, which operators, by law, keep for three years.

However, the Mobtel operator kept them for longer due to court cases filed by customers dissatisfied with their bills.

"That's when they realized they had all of 1999, and it was almost impossible to do, but they got lucky because one person came forward and said, ‘Guys, we have this,’” said Gunjić.

Covert Investigation: The Service That Doesn’t Forgive

The data from the base stations not only linked Ratko Romić, a member of the service, to Ćuruvija’s murder but also connected two other individuals.

These were the then-head of Belgrade's State Security, Milan Radonjić, and Miroslav Kurak, a former operative of the service and a member of the reserve unit of the Special Operations Unit.

The key evidence, according to the family’s lawyer, Slobodan Ružić, was the base station data.

"In my opinion, the most important evidence, because it shows that Romić and Kurak were at the murder scene and the day before. When you have mobile phone movement according to the base stations, you can’t pinpoint it to the meter, but you can determine a zone very close to the murder site. They were there, communicating with each other—Romić, Kurak, and Radonjić," explained Ružić.

The person from Mobtel who revealed to Inspector Dragan Kecman that the base station data, a crucial piece of evidence for the trial of the journalist's murder, had been preserved, was not forgiven by the service.

"Mobtel was bought by Telenor in 2006-7, I can’t remember exactly when. All Mobtel employees moved to Telenor, except for one person. The one who gave Kecman the base station data. That’s the kind of system we’re talking about. We’re talking about a time when Milošević’s socialists were not even in power. This country isn’t even run by politicians; it’s essentially run by someone else. These others decide whether that person will transfer to Telenor and even have a job," said Perica Gunjić.

The power of the system within the system is best demonstrated by the fact that Inspector Kecman had to hide the evidence he uncovered during the investigation for a full ten years from both his colleagues and superiors.

Dragan Kecman:

"To be honest, I hid it well. Very few people knew about that evidence. The prosecutor knew, and just a couple of people from the team working with me. I told them, 'Nobody can find out about this, either it's me or it's you. This must not get out.'"

"I kept it from everyone. It never occurred to me to discuss it with any politician. If I had informed my superiors, we wouldn’t have filed criminal charges today. Not because they would have leaked anything, but we all know how it goes — my superiors report to their bosses, who report further up, until it reaches the ministers, and — that's it. Everything would have gone in a completely different direction."

While the professionals fought the system and gathered evidence, those in the deep state were also doing their part - covering tracks and intimidating witnesses.

The goal was to never shed light on the murder of journalist Slavko Ćuruvija.

"When secret services do this, they don't want it to be revealed. And among these people, just like in the mafia, there's always something like 'omerta,' a conspiracy of silence," said Dragan Bujošević.

Despite this conspiracy, in the first decade of the 2000s, verdicts for political murders during Slobodan Milošević's regime began to emerge.

The mechanism that ultimately kills became visible to everyone.

“The Ibarska highway case, where 37 people were tracking Vuk Drašković, and unfortunately, people who were later killed. The murder was carried out with a truck driven by Nenad Ilić, a member of the Special Operations Unit (JSO). After that, Ivan Stambolić was killed after Radomir Marković, as proven in the trial, gave Legija a photograph of Ivan Stambolić to prevent the wrong person from being killed. Finally, there was the attempted murder of Vuk Drašković in Budva, where Romić and others went to survey and prepare the location at Drašković’s house in Budva. Then, members of the JSO arrived and attempted the assassination," said Ružić.

Despite the clarity of the situation, there was no trial in sight for the murder of the journalist.

Apart from anniversaries of the murder, the Ćuruvija case was rarely mentioned.

And when it was, there were attempts to steer the investigation in a different direction.

"At one point, it was believed that some other people killed Ćuruvija because that story was deliberately spread—we don’t know. It's possible that the service deliberately put out the story that some, let’s not mention names, that two men killed Ćuruvija. And then it turned out that both of those men were themselves killed," said Bujošević.

The power of the system within the system is best demonstrated by the fact that Inspector Kecman had to hide the evidence he uncovered during the investigation for a full ten years, not

Almost every year, new alleged perpetrators would emerge.

"Releasing names of killers to the public, names that, according to those investigating the case, could not have committed the crime—this is not just irresponsible. People in the service, in the police, in politics don't make such mistakes accidentally. They send specific messages." Said Perica Gunjić.

"All the while, there has been a struggle between two groups of people. One group puts in enormous efforts to resolve this case, including numerous police officers, inspectors, prosecutors, politicians, and above all, journalists. On the other side, there is also serious effort from what I believe is a larger group, including current and former State Security officers and their associates who are everywhere—in the prosecutor's office, the courts, and the media." said Ružić.

Formation of the Commission

The first real progress in solving the murder of journalist Slavko Ćuruvija happened 15 years after the crime, at a time when the same parties were in power as when Ćuruvija was killed—the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Progressive Party, which had evolved from the Serbian Radical Party.

"We live in such a country. This is not a democratic state, and certain processes here only happen after a political decision is made. This is how things work in the judiciary, too. In important cases, a political decision is needed for the ball to start rolling." Said Ružić.

Journalists initiated an effort to investigate the investigations themselves, leading to the creation of a special commission tasked with analyzing the work of authorities in journalist murder cases.

Veran Matić: "The Commission was extremely important because it brought together key figures from both sides—BIA and the Ministry of Interior—along with us journalists. At one point, I said this is important for all of us. It’s important for BIA to reveal the truth because all signs point to State Security's involvement. It's important for the police, who hadn’t managed to solve the case."

On September 20, 2013, through the Bureau for the Coordination of Intelligence Services, chaired by Aleksandar Vučić, the Commission for Investigating Journalists' Murders was formed.

Veran Matić, who had proposed the idea of creating the commission, was appointed president.

For part of the public, the fact that progress was made during Vučić's time in power was controversial, as Vučić had been the Minister of Information during Milošević's rule—a period when the state cracked down on all media that resisted pressure.

Censorship, harsh regulations, and an unconstitutional Information Law are strong reasons why this period is unforgettable for journalists.

However, another part of the public saw Vučić's move as a message that the state had learned its lesson and would cease persecuting dissidents.

Veran Matić: "Political will is absolutely crucial, and it surfaced with Aleksandar Vučić, who had a personal motive as well—he was the Minister of Information at the time."

"Public statements only came out during the anniversaries of Ćuruvija's murder, where promises were made that the case would be resolved soon, and they'd say, 'It's almost solved, we'll have it tomorrow, I swear.' But in reality, the politicians saying this knew nothing was happening," Perica Gunjić emphasized.

"I realized that the Ćuruvija case weighed heavily on Aleksandar Vučić. He was the wartime censor, he held those meetings with editors, and maybe he felt it would be good for him to show that he wasn’t hiding anything. But I eventually concluded that his motives didn’t matter." Said Ljiljana Smajlović

"Absolutely, he tried to clear his name, no doubt about it. He wanted to present himself as completely innocent in the whole situation. But what he did as the Minister of Information during the biggest crackdown on journalists in Serbia’s history—well, I'm afraid you can't wash that away. It’s like Macbeth—washing your hands, washing, but... you can’t clean them." Said Branka Prpa

Veran Matić: "When the Commission was formed, for several months, maybe even a year, there was a general belief that this was just another commission that would do some work but ultimately resolve nothing. After two years, it became very clear that the commission was doing serious work."

Expectations were high.

Along with the Commission, the prosecutor was given a Task Force within the police, which dealt with specific investigations into journalist murders.

Dragan Kecman, the inspector who had previously worked on the Ćuruvija case, headed the investigation.

Ljiljana Smajlović: "As soon as the Commission was formed, we came across Dragan Kecman, who said, 'I've practically solved this murder.'"

Kecman had an important piece of evidence—he had reconstructed the movements of the key suspects. He was just missing a little more to complete the case.

He decided to contact Goran Novaković, the head of security at the Zabela prison.

Breaking the Code of Silence

At that time, those responsible for the political murders of the 1990s were serving their sentences at Zabela, including Radomir Marković, with whom they attempted to speak again.
Marković refused, but the Commission members learned that Oliver Antić, an advisor to then-President Tomislav Nikolić and the head of the Commission for Decorations and Pardons, was visiting him in prison.

"We realized that discussions were being held about the release of Radomir Marković. After that, I issued a public statement saying it was absolutely unacceptable for a presidential advisor to visit someone convicted of so many murders, especially since he was also a target in the investigation into Slavko Ćuruvija's murder." Said Veran Matić

Marković did not leave Zabela, but word spread through the prison cells that the Ćuruvija case was being seriously worked on.
Instead of Marković, Milorad Ulemek "Legija," the former head of the Special Operations Unit, decided to break his code of silence.

He contacted the head of security at Zabela, Goran Novaković.

"He said that Milorad Ulemek had requested a conversation with him. During that conversation, Ulemek mentioned that he knew an investigation into the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija was ongoing, and that he might know something about it or have direct knowledge. Based on that statement, the evidence package the prosecutor already had was strengthened," added Veran Matić.

The former head of the Special Operations Unit (JSO) shared his direct knowledge of Slavko Ćuruvija's murder.

He said that Radomir Marković initially asked him to kill Ćuruvija, but since he couldn't do it, Marković later informed him that the job had been done.

Then, in 2000, while discussing an arrest operation with Radomir Marković, he asked who would be the "navigators" for the Unit, i.e., those responsible for assisting during the arrest.

Marković responded: "Those Radonja’s guys who killed Ćuruvija."

Statement by Milorad Ulemek, known as "Legija":

When I moved from the hallway into the lobby, where the headquarters of the State Security Service was located, I encountered Ratko Romić and Miroslav Kurak in that lobby. I realized that they were supposed to be the navigators, or the leaders of that operation.

Milorad Ulemek's claims were confirmed by the Simović brothers, members of the Zemun Clan, who were also sentenced to many years in prison.

They named the direct perpetrators of the murder, saying that Kurak and Romić, as Ćuruvija's killers, were to be eliminated under orders from Legija.

"The Simović brothers confirmed that, at one point after the murder, there was an order for the Zemun Clan to find and kill Romić and Kurak. That order came from Legija, and they sought them out, hunted them down to kill them as Slavko Ćuruvija's murderers. Then, after some time, the order was withdrawn," said Slobodan Ružić.

"The Service knew that those who work for it—every secret service does this—once someone has completed part of a job, they will eventually be killed to prevent them from talking or switching sides," said Bujošević.

With the testimonies of Legija, the Simović brothers, data from base stations, the Ćuran file, and other collected documentation, the investigation was completed.

It was apparent that Aleksandar Vučić, First Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Security Services Coordination Bureau was aware of this. Therefore, in late December 2013, he offered his resignation if the case of Slavko Ćuruvija's murder was not resolved.

Aleksandar Vučić at a 2013 conference:

"I have offered you the best gift on a silver platter if this case is not solved, so you don’t need to worry much. There will be good news, either my resignation for my political opponents or great news for the citizens of Serbia that we have managed to solve a terrible crime."

Raising the indictment and collapse of the defense

Two weeks later, at the prosecutor's order, the suspects were arrested. The news was reported by all media outlets.

RTV DNEVNIK: January 14, 2014
The suspects in the murder of journalist and owner of Dnevni telegraf, Slavko Ćuruvija, former members of the State Security, Milan Radonjić and Ratko Romić, were arrested around noon in Belgrade.

AL JAZEERA: January 14, 2014
The prosecution states that Radonjić and Romić were the organizers of Ćuruvija's murder, while the person who ordered and the direct executor were former head of State Security Radomir Marković and Miroslav Kurak.

The arrests were followed by an emergency press conference. The prosecutor, 15 years after the crime, also revealed the motive for Slavko Ćuruvija’s murder.

"Like in the case of Stambolić, and the cases of Budva and the Ibarska Highway, based on the current information available, the motive, also in this case of Slavko Ćuruvija’s murder is political. I do not rule out the possibility that during the investigation we might uncover additional motives, possibly personal ones, but at this moment, the dominant motive for the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija is political," said the prosecutor.

After that, everything moved quickly. In less than half a year, charges were filed.

The accused were also interrogated.

It seemed that, confident the police and the prosecutor did not have data from mobile base stations proving they were at the crime scene and communicated with each other, the accused provided different claims—certain they had alibis.

One allegedly celebrated his daughter’s birthday in Borča, while the other claimed not to know the accused. The inspector knew then—the case was solved.

"What’s crucial is that their defense fell apart. Romić’s defense collapsed because he claimed he was celebrating his child’s birthday and that’s why he passed through there by car, and that’s why the mobile base stations registered him. Radonjić’s defense fell apart because he claimed he didn’t know, and had never communicated with Miroslav Kurak, yet there is data proving they communicated over those two days," said Ružić.

Despite all the evidence, including testimonies from former close associates like Milorad Ulemek "Legija," the accused former members of the State Security have consistently claimed from the beginning that the case is a fabricated process, designed to serve as a way to absolve NATO of its bombing of Serbia.

"State Security is a very powerful service. In many parts, it is highly professional. Here, we are talking about the darkest parts of that service, not the whole Service. Such a powerful service, which knows everything about everyone, would have told us who killed Slavko Ćuruvija, if it wasn’t the people who are currently accused," explained Perica Gunjić.

Trial in Absentia

While Marković, Radonjić, and Romić awaited trial from prison, Miroslav Kurak, whom the prosecution accused of shooting Slavko Ćuruvija, was on the run.

He remains at large.

For a while, he advertised safari hunting in Africa, where he worked as a guide. At the Commission's insistence, a targeted manhunt was launched for him, and during 2021, an attempt was made to arrest him.
"At that time, some progress was made, and certain negotiations took place, which resulted in a decision to carry out the arrest. However, the night before the operation, he disappeared," explained Veran Matić.

Just as it has not been determined to this day who and how informed Kurak about his impending arrest, it remains unclear why the police did not act more appropriately and protect their inspector in 2006 when Kurak, after being informed that Kecman was investigating him in connection with Slavko Ćuruvija's murder, said, "Kecman needs to be cooled off."
There was an official note on this, but no action was taken, and the deep state continued to operate even after the Commission was established and there was a clear expression of political will.
"The fact is that Dragan Kecman never had police protection. You are the one trying to investigate this, and then you hear that someone mentioned killing you. That person is not just anyone off the street, but a serious professional killer from the Service, maybe even the one who killed Ćuruvija, the one who, according to Branka Prpa's testimony, remained calm, did not flinch, cold-blooded, a ruthless professional," added Gunjić.

"At one point, we discovered that all of us from the Commission were being monitored, our data was being checked en masse from different computers in various parts of Serbia, yet it was never investigated what happened with that data, who was collecting it," said Veran Matić.
"What I remember most was how utterly powerless we were against the military service. We requested that the Military Intelligence Service provide us with all the information they had on the matter. The Military Intelligence Service responded that they had nothing. They knew nothing, had nothing. Then we asked for the director to come. He was rather cheerful, and there was no way to unsettle him. It was clear that no Commission could affect him," explained Ljiljana Smajlović.

Widespread amnesia also affected most former State Security members called to testify in the trial for the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija.
This prolonged the trial, and public interest waned. However, one testimony exposed how deeply rooted the dark parts of the state service from the 1990s were.
DB agent Aleksandar Radosavljević, although in his 2007 statement to the prosecutor, he mentioned seeing a white Golf from the State Security’s vehicle fleet near the crime scene, could not remember this at trial.
"When the judge asked if he had indeed seen that Golf, he was confused in his response. He said, 'No, no, but maybe I did.' That was the kind of answer he gave," said Gunjić.

The suspicion that witnesses could still be intimidated even years after the murder was reinforced by the fact that in 2017, the court lifted the detention of two defendants, Ratko Romić and Milan Radonjić, and replaced it with house arrest, under electronic monitoring.
"That was inexplicable to me. If a guilty verdict is reached and this verdict is upheld, this period will be counted as if they were in prison, in Zabela, under harsh conditions, in solitary confinement," said Veran Matić.

Romić and Radonjić will await the final verdict in freedom because the Court of Appeals, after six years of house arrest, lifted that measure as well.
"On one hand, this is a privilege for them, and on the other, the court is positioning itself for a possible acquittal to minimize financial damage to the state," said Ružić.

Despite all the obstructions, cover-ups, and destruction of evidence, the court delivered its first verdict nearly four years after the trial began and twenty years after the murder.

Overturned Verdict: An Unknown Person as the Perpetrator

Radomir Marković, Milan Radonjić, Ratko Romić, and Miroslav Kurak (who was tried in absentia) were sentenced to a total of 100 years in prison.
At first glance, justice seemed to have been served, but not for long.
In the verdict, alongside the former State Security officials, an unknown person was also named as the perpetrator.
"The court delivered a very contradictory decision. The sentence in terms of the length of punishment is, at least to me, just. However, it introduces this 'unknown person' and deviates from the indictment, which is basically judicial abc.... You know that a verdict written in that way will be overturned on appeal, which is exactly what happened," said Gunjić.

Branka Prpa was the only direct witness.
She repeatedly emphasized that she could speak with 60% certainty and that, based on her memory, the description of the perpetrator she remembered did not match the one mentioned in the indictment.
"When someone experiences something so horrific in life, the natural instinct is to suppress it. But for 24 years, I had to keep that image in my head because the justice for him, the identification and conviction of the killers, depended on my memory," explained Branka Prpa.
The first verdict was overturned.
A new trial followed, as well as a new verdict, essentially the same as the previous one.
The trial court thus shifted the decision to the Court of Appeals, as the second verdict also had to be overturned.
The Court of Appeals then decided to reopen the case—to question the accused and key witnesses and reexamine the evidence.
The trial concluded after a month.
The prosecutor believes the indictment has been proven. The final verdict is awaited.
"Twice, the trial court delivered a guilty verdict, sentencing the defendants to a total of 100 years in prison. In this additional period, there were no significant challenges or new evidence," said Matić.
"I don't know if there's another society that would put its deep state on trial. The state must be able to rely on these services, and these services know that and protect themselves. So if this ends well, in the way I believe it should, it will be hats off..," said Smajlović.
"Every year that passes without punishment, they kill him again. On the other hand, the personality of Slavko Ćuruvija, who hasn’t received justice, is now so alive and powerful that with each passing year, it highlights more and more the absurdity of this idiotic, corrupt, interconnected system that has been protecting its people for over 20 years," said Voja Žanetić.

"Well, it seems to me that the people who organized all of this are here, and they should tell us who gave the order. I'll repeat, that source from the State Security told me—twice the orders came, and twice it was said they weren’t from the right address. The third time, it came from the right address," stated Bujošević.

The indictment did not prove that the "right address" was the Milošević-Marković family.

Even after the verdict, the masterminds will remain unknown.

"That is proof that the structure that carried out these crimes, this state structure, is still so powerful that you can’t even ask the question about the masterminds, even if, in some cases, they are dead," said Prpa.
"What would solve the whole problem is uncovering the entire chain of command, who was involved. Because by doing so, we will hopefully learn that the executive, elected political power cannot order state bodies to do anything, let alone decide who they will kill," said Žanetić.

Whatever verdict the court delivers, it will be remembered that the secret service was used for the persecution, surveillance, and even elimination of political opponents of one regime.
And this is not just an impression, it has been proven during other trials and verdicts that have been rendered.
In the case of Slavko Ćuruvija’s murder, the court record will certainly include the testimony of one of the service members who followed the journalist for months before his murder.
"He told the court that Slavko Ćuruvija was not a traitor to the country. He knew what Ćuruvija was doing better than Ćuruvija himself; he listened to all his phone calls for months, and he concluded nothing of the sort, which today they are repeating at the trial, essentially running a campaign, trying to present him as a traitor who practically deserved to be killed like a dog in the street," explained Perica Gunjić.

Marking a New Target: Traitor
Before the murder, Slavko Ćuruvija was branded as a traitor and a foreign mercenary, with the help of media loyal to the regime at the time.

Today, a quarter of a century later, we still casually divide people into traitors and patriots, theirs and ours, destroyers and builders of the system and the state.

"It’s ugly when anyone calls someone a big-nose, or bald, or fat. That’s all ugly, but it’s not as deadly as when you label someone a traitor. When you do that, you're essentially saying, 'Okay, what we do to traitors?' Well, this," said Bujošević.

For Slavko Ćuruvija, it was 12 bullets. The state killed him.

"It’s clear that wherever the state is involved, we never get justice because if we send the message that those people can kill journalists, such a country has no future," explained Gunjić.

"So that no one, ever again, in this country can kill journalists, thinking they will get away with it, or believe that they are masters of life and death—they are not. Without public scrutiny, there is no accountability for those in power. Therefore, the public is both a defense against autocracy and a safeguard against potential crimes and destruction. That’s why the profession you engage in, and the profession for which Slavko gave his life, is so important, both for society and the state," said Prpa.

The time in which Slavko Ćuruvija lived and worked was a time when journalists who performed their duties in the public interest were declared as undermining the constitutional order, as internal enemies and traitors.
Several independent media outlets were closed, persecuted, and punished, but journalists in those circumstances remained journalists. They did not back down. That fact can never be erased.
Supporting this are the prosecutor's closing arguments at the end of the trial—a reminder both to those who threaten and mark targets, and to those who so easily give up on their profession as journalists.
"Slavko Ćuruvija was not a traitor, but a patriot whose criticism provoked the anger and outrage of the highest state authorities. His courage ultimately cost him his life," said the prosecutor.

When darkness prevails - part 2 (VIDEO)